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Abstract
We introduce hardness in relative entropy, a new notion of hardness for search
problems which on the one hand is satisfied by all one-way functions and on the
other hand implies both next-block pseudoentropy and inaccessible entropy, two forms
of computational entropy used in recent constructions of pseudorandom generators
and statistically hiding commitment schemes, respectively. Thus, hardness in relative
entropy unifies the latter two notions of computational entropy and sheds light on
the apparent “duality” between them. Additionally, it yields a more modular and
illuminating proof that one-way functions imply next-block inaccessible entropy, similar
in structure to the proof that one-way functions imply next-block pseudoentropy
(Vadhan and Zheng, STOC ‘12).
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1 Introduction
1.1 One-way functions and computational entropy
One-way functions [DH76] are on one hand the minimal assumption for complexity-based
cryptography [IL89], but on the other hand can be used to construct a remarkable array
of cryptographic primitives, including such powerful objects as CCA-secure symmetric
encryption, zero-knowledge proofs and statistical zero-knowledge arguments for all of NP,
and secure multiparty computation with an honest majority [GGM86, GMW91, GMW87,
HILL99, Rom90, Nao91, HNO+09]. All of these constructions begin by converting the
“raw hardness” of a one-way function (OWF) to one of the following more structured
cryptographic primitives: a pseudorandom generator (PRG) [BM82, Yao82], a universal
one-way hash function (UOWHF) [NY89], or a statistically hiding commitment scheme
(SHC) [BCC88].
The original constructions of these three primitives from arbitrary one-way func-
tions [HILL99, Rom90, HNO+09] were all very complicated and inefficient. Over the past
decade, there has been a series of simplifications and efficiency improvements to these
constructions [HRVW09, HRV13, HHR+10, VZ12], leading to a situation where the con-
structions of two of these primitives — PRGs and SHCs — share a very similar structure
and seem “dual” to each other. Specifically, these constructions proceed as follows:
1. Show that every OWF f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n has a gap between its “real entropy”
and an appropriate form of “computational entropy”. Specifically, for constructing
PRGs, it is shown that the function G(x) = (f(x), x1, x2, . . . , xn) has “next-block
pseudoentropy” at least n+ ω(log n) while its real entropy is H (G(Un)) = n [VZ12]
where H (·) denotes Shannon entropy. For constructing SHCs, it is shown that the
function G(x) = (f(x)1, . . . , f(x)n, x) has “next-block accessible entropy” at most
n− ω(log n) while its real entropy is again H (G(Un)) = n [HRVW09]. Note that the
differences between the two cases are whether we break x or f(x) into individual bits
(which matters because the “next-block” notions of computational entropy depend
on the block structure) and whether the form of computational entropy is larger or
smaller than the real entropy.
2. An “entropy equalization” step that converts G into a similar generator where the
real entropy in each block conditioned on the prefix before it is known. This step is
exactly the same in both constructions.
3. A “flattening” step that converts the (real and computational) Shannon entropy
guarantees of the generator into ones on (smoothed) min-entropy and max-entropy.
This step is again exactly the same in both constructions.
4. A “hashing” step where high (real or computational) min-entropy is converted to uni-
form (pseudo)randomness and low (real or computational) max-entropy is converted
to a small-support or disjointness property. For PRGs, this step only requires random-
ness extractors [HILL99, NZ96], while for SHCs it requires (information-theoretic)
interactive hashing [NOVY98, DHRS04]. (Constructing full-fledged SHCs in this step
also utilizes UOWHFs, which can be constructed from one-way functions [Rom90].
Without UOWHFs, we obtain a weaker binding property, which nevertheless suffices
for constructing statistical zero-knowledge arguments for all of NP.)
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This common construction template came about through a back-and-forth exchange of
ideas between the two lines of work. Indeed, the uses of computational entropy notions,
flattening, and hashing originate with PRGs [HILL99], whereas the ideas of using next-block
notions, obtaining them from breaking (f(x), x) into short blocks, and entropy equalization
originate with SHCs [HRVW09]. All this leads to a feeling that the two constructions, and
their underlying computational entropy notions, are “dual” to each other and should be
connected at a formal level.
In this paper, we make progress on this project of unifying the notions of computational
entropy, by introducing a new computational entropy notion that yields both next-block
pseudoentropy and next-block accessible entropy in a clean and modular fashion. It
is inspired by the proof of [VZ12] that (f(x), x1, . . . , xn) has next-block pseudoentropy
n+ ω(log n), which we will describe now.
1.2 Next-block pseudoentropy via relative pseudoentropy
We recall the definition of next-block pseudoentropy, and the result of [VZ12] relating it to
one-wayness.
Definition 1.1 (next-block pseudoentropy, informal). Let n be a security parameter,
and X = (X1, . . . , Xm) be a random variable distributed on strings of length poly(n).
We say that X has next-block pseudoentropy at least k if there is a random variable
Z = (Z1, . . . , Zm), jointly distributed with X, such that:
1. For all i = 1, . . . ,m, (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi) is computationally indistinguishable from
(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Zi).
2.
∑m
i=1 H (Zi|X1, . . . , Xi−1) ≥ k.
Equivalently, for I uniformly distributed in [m], XI has conditional pseudoentropy at least
k/m given (X1, . . . , Xi−1).
It was conjectured in [HRV10] that next-block pseudoentropy could be obtained from
any OWF by breaking its input into bits, and this conjecture was proven in [VZ12]:
Theorem 1.2 ([VZ12], informal). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a one-way function, let
X be uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n, and let X = (X1, . . . , Xm) be a partition of X into
blocks of length O(log n). Then (f(X), X1, . . . , Xm) has next-block pseudoentropy at least
n+ ω(log n).
The intuition behind Theorem 1.2 is that since X is hard to sample given f(X),
then it should have some extra computational entropy given f(X). This intuition is
formalized using the following notion of “relative pseudoentropy,” which is a renaming
of [VZ12]’s notion of “KL-hard for sampling,” to better unify the terminology with the
notions introduced in this work.
Definition 1.3 (relative pseudoentropy). Let n be a security parameter, and (X,Y ) be a
pair of random variables, jointly distributed over strings of length poly(n). We say that X
has relative pseudoentropy at least ∆ given Y if for all probabilistic polynomial-time S, we
have
KL (X,Y ‖ S(Y ), Y ) ≥ ∆,
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where KL (· ‖ ·) denotes the relative entropy (a.k.a. Kullback–Leibler divergence).1
That is, it is hard for any efficient adversary S to sample the conditional distribution
of X given Y , even approximately.
The first step of the proof of Theorem 1.2 is to show that one-wayness implies relative
pseudoentropy (which can be done with a one-line calculation):
Lemma 1.4. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a one-way function and let X be uniformly
distributed in {0, 1}n. Then X has relative pseudoentropy at least ω(log n) given f(X).
Next, we break X into short blocks, and show that the relative pseudoentropy is
preserved:
Lemma 1.5. Let n be a security parameter, let (X,Y ) be random variables distributed on
strings of length poly(n), let X = (X1, . . . , Xm) be a partition of X into blocks, and let I
be uniformly distributed in [m]. If X has relative pseudoentropy at least ∆ given Y , then
XI has relative pseudoentropy at least ∆/m given (Y,X1, . . . , XI−1).
Finally, the main part of the proof is to show that, once we have short blocks, relative
pseudoentropy is equivalent to a gap between conditional pseudoentropy and real conditional
entropy.
Lemma 1.6. Let n be a security parameter, Y be a random variable distributed on strings
of length poly(n), and X a random variable distributed on strings of length O(log n). Then
X has relative pseudoentropy at least ∆ given Y iff X has conditional pseudoentropy at
least H (X|Y ) + ∆ given Y .
Putting these three lemmas together, we see that when f is a one-way function, and
we break X into blocks of length O(log n) to obtain (f(X), X1, . . . , Xm), on average,
the conditional pseudoentropy of XI given (f(X), X1, . . . , XI−1) is larger than its real
conditional entropy by ω(log n)/m. This tells us that the next-block pseudoentropy of
(f(X), X1, . . . , Xm) is larger than its real entropy by ω(log n), as claimed in Theorem 1.2.
We remark that Lemma 1.6 explains why we need to break the input of the one-way
function into short blocks: it is false when X is long. Indeed, if f is a one-way function, then
we have already seen that X has ω(log n) relative pseudoentropy given f(X) (Lemma 1.4),
but it does not have conditional pseudoentropy noticeably larger than H (X|f(X)) given
f(X) (as correct preimages can be efficiently distinguished from incorrect ones using f).
1.3 Inaccessible entropy
As mentioned above, for constructing SHCs from one-way functions, the notion of next-block
pseudoentropy is replaced with next-block accessible entropy:
Definition 1.7 (next-block accessible entropy, informal). Let n be a security parameter,
and Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) be a random variable distributed on strings of length poly(n). We
say that Y has next-block accessible entropy at most k if the following holds.
Let G˜ be any probabilistic poly(n)-time algorithm that takes a sequence of uniformly
random strings R˜ = (R˜1, . . . , R˜m) and outputs a sequence Y˜ = (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜m) in an “online
1Recall that for random variables A and B with Supp(A) ⊆ Supp(B), the relative entropy is defined by
KL (A ‖B) = Ea←A [log(Pr [A = a] /Pr [B = a])].
4
fashion” by which we mean that Y˜i = G˜(R˜1, . . . , R˜i) depends on only the first i random
strings of G˜ for i = 1, . . . ,m. Suppose further that Supp(Y˜ ) ⊆ Supp(Y ).
Then we require:
m∑
i=1
H
(
Y˜i|R˜1, . . . , R˜i−1
)
≤ k.
(Next-block) accessible entropy differs from (next-block) pseudoentropy in two ways:
1. Accessible entropy is useful as an upper bound on computational entropy, and is
interesting when it is smaller than the real entropy H (Y ). We refer to the gap
H (Y )− k as the next-block inaccessible entropy of Y .
2. The accessible entropy adversary G˜ is trying to generate the random variables Yi
conditioned on the history rather than recognize them. Note that we take the “history”
to not only be the previous blocks (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜i−1), but the coin tosses (R˜1, . . . , R˜i−1)
used to generate those blocks.
Note that one unsatisfactory aspect of the definition is that when the random variable
Y is not flat (i.e. uniform on its support), then there can be an adversary G˜ achieving
accessible entropy even larger than H (Y ), for example by making Y˜ uniform on Supp(Y ).
Similarly to (and predating) Theorem 1.2, it is known that one-wayness implies next-
block inaccessible entropy.
Theorem 1.8 ([HRVW09]). Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a one-way function, let X be
uniformly distributed in {0, 1}n, and let (Y1, . . . , Ym) be a partition of Y = f(X) into
blocks of length O(log n). Then (Y1, . . . , Ym, X) has next-block accessible entropy at most
n− ω(log n).
Unfortunately, however, the existing proof of Theorem 1.8 is not modular like that
of Theorem 1.2. In particular, it does not isolate the step of relating one-wayness to
entropy-theoretic measures (like Lemma 1.4 does) or the significance of having short blocks
(like Lemma 1.6 does).
1.4 Our results
We remedy the above state of affairs by providing a new, more general notion of hardness
in relative entropy that allows us to obtain next-block inaccessible entropy in a modular
way while also encompassing what is needed for next-block pseudoentropy.
Like in relative pseudoentropy, we will consider a pair of jointly distributed random
variables (Y,X). Following the spirit of accessible entropy, the adversary G˜ for our new
notion will try to generate Y together with X, rather than taking Y as input. That is,
G˜ will take randomness R˜ and output a pair (Y˜ , X˜) = G˜(R˜) = (G˜1(R˜), G˜2(R˜)), which we
require to be always within the support of (Y,X). Note that G˜ need not be an online
generator; it can generate both Y˜ and X˜ using the same randomness R˜. Of course, if
(Y,X) is efficiently samplable (as it would be in most cryptographic applications), G˜ could
generate (Y˜ , X˜) identically distributed to (Y,X) by just using the “honest” sampler G for
(Y,X). So, in addition, we require that the adversary G˜ also come with a simulator S, that
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can simulate its coin tosses given only Y˜ . The goal of the adversary is to minimize the
relative entropy
KL
(
R˜, Y˜
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y )
for a uniformly random R˜. This divergence measures both how well G˜1 approximates the
distribution of Y as well as how well S simulates the corresponding coin tosses of G˜1. Note
that when G˜ is the honest sampler G, the task of S is exactly to sample from the conditional
distribution of R˜ given G1(R˜) = Y . However, the adversary may reduce the divergence by
instead designing the sampler G˜ and simulator S to work in concert, potentially trading
off how well G˜(R˜) approximates Y in exchange for easier simulation by S. Explicitly, the
definition is as follows.
Definition 1.9 (hardness in relative entropy, informal version of Definition 3.2). Let n
be a security parameter, and (Y,X) be a pair of random variables jointly distributed over
strings of length poly(n). We say that (Y,X) has hardness at least ∆ in relative entropy
if the following holds.
Let G˜ = (G˜1, G˜2) and S be probabilistic poly(n)-time algorithms such that Supp(G˜(R˜)) ⊆
Supp((Y,X)), where R˜ is uniformly distributed. Then writing Y˜ = G˜1(R˜), we require that
KL
(
R˜, Y˜
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y ) ≥ ∆.
Similarly to Lemma 1.4, we can show that one-way functions achieve this notion of
hardness in relative entropy.
Lemma 1.10. Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a one-way function and let X be uniformly
distributed in {0, 1}n. Then (f(X), X) has hardness ω(log n) in relative entropy.
Note that this lemma implies Lemma 1.4. If we take G˜ to be the “honest” sampler
G˜(x) = (f(x), x), then we have:
KL (X, f(X) ‖ S(Y ), Y ) = KL
(
R˜, Y˜
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y ) ,
which is is ω(log n) by Lemma 1.10. That is, relative pseudoentropy (as in Definition 1.3
and Lemma 1.4) is obtained by fixing G˜ and focusing on the hardness for the simulator
S, i.e. the divergence KL (X,Y ‖S(Y ), Y ). Furthermore, the step of breaking into short
blocks (Lemma 1.5) is equivalent to requiring the simulator be online and showing that
relative pseudoentropy implies the following notion of next-block relative pseudoentropy :
Definition 1.11 (next-block relative pseudoentropy, informal). Let n be a security param-
eter, (X,Y ) be jointly distributed random variables over strings of length poly(n), and let
X = (X1, . . . , Xm) be a partition of X into blocks. We say that X has next-block relative
pseudoentropy at least ∆ given Y if for all probabilistic polynomial-time S, we have
m∑
i=1
KL (Xi|X<i, Y ‖ S(X<i, Y )|X<i, Y ) ≥ ∆,
where we use the notation z<i
def
= (z1, . . . , zi−1).
Here, the simulator S is required to be “online” in the sense that it cannot simulate
(X1, . . . , Xm) at once, but must simulate Xi only as a function of X<i and Y .
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In particular, Lemma 1.6 is thus equivalent to the statement that having next-block
relative pseudoentropy at least ∆ for blocks of length O(log n) is equivalent to having
next-block pseudoentropy at least ∆ +
∑m
i=1 H (Xi|X<i, Y ) in the sense of Definition 1.1.
Conversely, we show that inaccessible entropy arises from hardness in relative entropy
by first requiring the generator G to be online and breaking the relative entropy into blocks
to obtain the following next-block hardness property.
Definition 1.12 (next-block hardness in relative entropy, informal). Let n be a security
parameter, and Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) be a random variable distributed on strings of length
poly(n). We say that Y has next-block hardness at least ∆ in relative entropy if the
following holds.
Let G˜ be any probabilistic poly(n)-time algorithm that takes a sequence of uniformly
random strings R˜ = (R˜1, . . . , R˜m) and outputs a sequence Y˜ = (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜m) in an “online
fashion” by which we mean that Y˜i = G˜(R˜1, . . . , R˜i) depends on only the first i random
strings of G˜ for i = 1, . . . ,m. Suppose further that Supp(Y˜ ) ⊆ Supp(Y ). Additionally, let
S be a probabilistic poly(n)-time algorithms such for all i = 1, . . . ,m, S takes as input
R̂1, . . . , R̂i−1 and Yi and outputs R̂i, where R̂j has the same length as R˜j. Then we require
that for all such (G˜,S), we have:
m∑
i=1
KL
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Yi|R̂<i, Y<i) ≥ ∆.
Observe that hardness in relative entropy can be seen as the specific case of next-block
hardness in relative entropy when there is only one block (i.e., setting m = 1 in the
previous definition).
Next, we fix the simulator, analogously to how relative pseudoentropy was obtained by
fixing the generator, and obtain next-block inaccessible relative entropy :
Definition 1.13 (next-block inaccessible relative entropy, informal). Let n be a security
parameter, and Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) be a random variable distributed on strings of length
poly(n). We say that Y has next-block inaccessible relative entropy at least ∆ if the
following holds.
Let G˜ be any probabilistic poly(n)-time algorithm that takes a sequence of uniformly
random strings R˜ = (R˜1, . . . , R˜m) and outputs a sequence Y˜ = (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜m) in an online
fashion, and such that Supp(Y˜ ) ⊆ Supp(Y ). Then we require that for all such G˜, we have:
m∑
i=1
KL
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i) ≥ ∆,
where R = (R1, . . . , Rm) is a dummy random variable independent of Y .
That is, the goal of the online generator G˜ is to generate Y˜i given the history of coin
tosses R˜<i with the same conditional distribution as Yi given Y<i. As promised, there is
no explicit simulator in the definition of next-block inaccessible relative entropy, as we
essentially dropped all R̂ variables from the definition of next-block hardness in relative
entropy. Nevertheless we can obtain it from hardness in relative entropy by using sufficiently
short blocks:
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Lemma 1.14. Let n be a security parameter, let Y be a random variable distributed on
strings of length poly(n), and let Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) be a partition of Y into blocks of length
O(log n).
If (Y1, . . . , Ym) has next-block hardness at least ∆ in relative entropy, then (Y1, . . . , Ym)
has next-block inaccessible relative entropy at least ∆− negl(n).
An intuition for the proof is that since the blocks are of logarithmic length, given Yi we
can simulate the corresponding coin tosses of R˜i of G˜ by rejection sampling and succeed
with high probability in poly(n) tries.
A nice feature of the definition of next-block inaccessible relative entropy compared
to inaccessible entropy is that it is meaningful even for non-flat random variables, as the
Kullback–Leibler divergence is always nonnegative. Moreover, for flat random variables, it
equals the inaccessible entropy:
Lemma 1.15. Suppose Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) is a flat random variable. Then Y has next-block
inaccessible relative entropy at least ∆ if and only if Y has accessible entropy at most
H (Y )−∆.
Intuitively, this lemma comes from the identity that if Y is a flat random variable
and Supp(Y˜ ) ⊆ Supp(Y ), then H
(
Y˜
)
= H (Y )−KL
(
Y˜
∥∥∥Y ). We stress that we do not
require the individual blocks Yi have flat distributions, only that the random variable Y as
a whole is flat. For example, if f is a function and X is uniform, then (f(X), X) is flat
even though f(X) itself may be far from flat.
Putting together Lemmas 1.10, 1.14, and 1.15, we obtain a new, more modular (and
slightly tighter) proof of Theorem 1.8. The reduction implicit in the combination of these
lemmas is the same as the one in [HRVW09], but the analysis is different. (In particular,
[HRVW09] makes no use of KL divergence.) Like the existing proof of Theorem 1.2,
this proof separates the move from one-wayness to a form of hardness involving relative
entropies, the role of short blocks, and the move from hardness in relative entropy to
computational entropy, as summarized in Figure 1. Moreover, this further illumination of
and toolkit for notions of computational entropy may open the door to other applications
in cryptography.
We remark that another interesting direction for future work is to find a construction of
universal one-way hash functions (UOWHFs) from one-way functions that follows a similar
template to the above constructions of PRGs and SHCs. There is now a construction
of UOWHFs based on a variant of inaccessible entropy [HHR+10], but it remains more
complex and inefficient than those of PRGs and SHCs.
2 Preliminaries
Notations. For a tuple x = (x1, . . . , xn), we write x≤i for (x1, . . . , xi), and x<i for
(x1, . . . , xi−1).
poly denotes the set of polynomial functions and negl the set of all negligible functions:
ε ∈ negl if for all p ∈ poly and large enough n ∈ N, ε(n) ≤ 1/p(n). We will sometimes
abuse notations and write poly(n) to mean p(n) for some p ∈ poly and similarly for negl(n).
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hardness in relative entropy
relative pseudoentropy
next-block hardness
in relative entropy
next-block relative pseudoentropy next-block inaccessible
relative entropy
next-block pseudoentropy gap next-block inaccessible entropy
Fix G˜ Make online and split into blocks
Make online and split into blocks Fix S for short blocks
Assuming short blocks Assuming flat distribution
Figure 1: Relationships between hardness notions.
ppt stands for probabilistic polynomial time and can be either in the uniform or
non-uniform model of computation. All our results are stated as uniform polynomial time
oracle reductions and are thus meaningful in both models.
For a random variable X over X , Supp(X) def= {x ∈ X : Pr[X = x] > 0} denotes the
support of X. A random variable is flat if it is uniform over its support. Random variables
will be written with uppercase letters and the associated lowercase letter represents a
generic element from its support.
Information theory.
Definition 2.1 (Entropy). For a random variable X and x ∈ Supp(X), the sample entropy
(also called surprise) of x is H∗x (X)
def
= log(1/Pr [X = x]). The entropy H (X) of X is the
expected sample entropy: H (X)
def
= Ex←X [H∗x (X)].
Definition 2.2 (Conditional entropy). Let (A,X) be a pair of random variables and
consider (a, x) ∈ Supp(A,X), the conditional sample entropy of (a, x) is H∗a,x (A|X) def=
log(1/Pr [A = a |X = x]) and the conditional entropy of A given X is the expected condi-
tional sample entropy:
H (A|X) def= E
(a,x)←(A,X)
[
log
1
Pr [A = a |X = x]
]
.
Proposition 2.3 (Chain rule for entropy). Let (A,X) be a pair of random variables, then
H (A,X) = H (A|X) + H (X) and for (a, x) ∈ Supp(A,X), H∗a,x (A,X) = H∗a,x (A|X) +
H∗x (X).
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Definition 2.4 (Relative entropy2). For a pair (A,B) of random variables and (a, b) ∈
Supp(A,B) the sample relative entropy (log-probability ratio) is:
KL∗a (A ‖B) def= log
Pr [A = a]
Pr [B = a]
,
and the relative entropy of A with respect to B is the expected sample relative entropy:
KL (A ‖B) def= E
a←A
[
log
Pr [A = a]
Pr [B = a]
]
.
Definition 2.5 (Conditional relative entropy). For pairs of random variables (A,X) and
(B, Y ), and (a, x) ∈ Supp(A,X), the conditional sample relative entropy is:
KL∗a,x (A|X ‖B|Y ) def= log
Pr [A = a|X = x]
Pr [B = a|Y = x] ,
and the conditional relative entropy is:
KL (A|X ‖B|Y ) def= E
(a,x)←(A,X)
[
log
Pr [A = a|X = x]
Pr [B = a|Y = x]
]
.
Proposition 2.6 (Chain rule for relative entropy). For pairs of random variables (X,A)
and (Y,B):
KL (A,X ‖B, Y ) = KL (A|X ‖B|Y ) + KL (X ‖Y ) ,
and for (a, x) ∈ Supp(A,X):
KL∗a,x (A,X ‖B, Y ) = KL∗a,x (A|X ‖B|Y ) + KL∗x (X ‖Y ) .
Proposition 2.7 (Data-processing inequality). Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables
and let f be a function defined on Supp(Y ), then:
KL (X ‖Y ) ≥ KL (f(X) ‖ f(Y )) .
Definition 2.8 (min relative entropy). Let (X,Y ) be a pair of random variables and
δ ∈ [0, 1]. We define KLδmin (X ‖Y ) to be the quantile of level δ of KL∗x (X ‖Y ), equivalently
it is the smallest ∆ ∈ R satisfying:
Pr
x←X
[KL∗x (X ‖Y ) ≤ ∆] ≥ δ ,
and it is characterized by the following equivalence:
KLδmin (X ‖Y ) > ∆ ⇐⇒ Pr
x←X
[KL∗x (X ‖Y ) ≤ ∆] < δ .
2Relative entropy is also commonly referred to as Kullback–Liebler divergence, which explains the
standard KL notation. We prefer to use relative entropy to have more uniformity across the notions
discussed in this work.
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Block generators
Definition 2.9 (Block generator). An m-block generator is a function G : {0, 1}s →∏m
i=1{0, 1}`i. Gi(r) denotes the i-th block of G on input r and |Gi| = `i denotes the bit
length of the i-th block.
Definition 2.10 (Online generator). An online m-block generator is a function G˜ :∏m
i=1{0, 1}si →
∏m
i=1{0, 1}`i such that for all i ∈ [m] and r ∈
∏m
i=1{0, 1}si, G˜i(r) only
depends on r≤i. We sometimes write G˜i(r≤i) when the input blocks i + 1, . . . ,m are
unspecified.
Definition 2.11 (Support). The support of a generator G is the support of the random
variable Supp
(
G(R)
)
for uniform input R. If G is an (m+ 1)-block generator, and Π is a
binary relation, we say that G is supported on Π if Supp
(
G≤m(R),Gm+1(R)
) ⊆ Π.
When G is an (m+ 1)-block generator supported on a binary relation Π, we will often
use the notation Gw
def
= Gm+1 to emphasize that the last block corresponds to a witness for
the first m blocks.
Cryptography.
Definition 2.12 (One-way Function). Let n be a security parameter, t = t(n) and ε = ε(n).
A function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a (t, ε)-one-way function if:
1. For all time t randomized algorithm A: Prx←Un
[
A
(
f(x)
) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≤ ε, where
Un is uniform over {0, 1}n.
2. There exists a polynomial time algorithm B such that B(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n.
If f is (nc, 1/nc)-one-way for every c ∈ N, we say that f is (strongly) one-way.
3 Search Problems and Hardness in Relative Entropy
In this section, we first present the classical notion of hard-on-average search problems and
introduce the new notion of hardness in relative entropy. We then relate the two notions
by proving that average-case hardness implies hardness in relative entropy.
3.1 Search problems
For a binary relation Π ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗, we write Π(y, w) for the predicate that is
true iff (y, w) ∈ Π and say that w is a witness for the instance y3. To each relation Π,
we naturally associate (1) a search problem: given y, find w such that Π(y, w) or state
that no such w exist and (2) the decision problem defined by the language LΠ
def
= {y ∈
{0, 1}∗ : ∃w ∈ {0, 1}∗, Π(y, w)}. FNP denotes the set of all relations Π computable
by a polynomial time algorithm and such that there exists a polynomial p such that
Π(y, w) ⇒ |w| ≤ p(|y|). Whenever Π ∈ FNP, the associated decision problem LΠ is in
NP. We now define average-case hardness.
3We used the unconventional notation y for the instance (instead of x) because our relations will often
be of the form Πf for some function f ; in this case an instance is some y in the range of f and a witness
for y is any preimage x ∈ f−1(y).
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Definition 3.1 (distributional search problem). A distributional search problem is a
pair (Π, Y ) where Π ⊆ {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ is a binary relation and Y is a random variable
supported on LΠ.
The problem (Π, Y ) is (t, ε)-hard if Pr
[
Π
(
Y,A(Y )
)] ≤ ε for all time t randomized
algorithm A, where the probability is over the distribution of Y and the randomness of A.
Example. For f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, the problem of inverting f is the search problem
associated with the relation Πf
def
= {(f(x), x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n}. If f is a (t, ε)-one-way
function, then the distributional search problem
(
Πf , f(X)
)
of inverting f on a uniform
random input X ∈ {0, 1}n is (t, ε)-hard.
Remark. Consider a distributional search problem (Π, Y ). Without loss of generality, there
exists a (possibly inefficient) two-block generator G = (G1,Gw) supported on Π such that
G1(R) = Y for uniform input R. If Gw is polynomial-time computable, it is easy to see that
the search problem
(
ΠG1 ,G1(R)
)
is at least as hard as (Π, Y ). The advantage of writing
the problem in this “functional” form is that the distribution (G1(R), R) over (instance,
witness) pairs is flat, which is a necessary condition to relate hardness to inaccessible
entropy (see Theorem 4.9).
Furthermore, if G1 is also polynomial-time computable and (Π, Y ) is (poly(n),negl(n))-
hard, then R 7→ G1(R) is a one-way function. Combined with the previous example, we see
that the existence of one-way functions is equivalent to the existence of (poly(n),negl(n))-
hard search problems for which (instance, witness) pairs can be efficiently sampled.
3.2 Hardness in relative entropy
Instead of considering an adversary directly attempting to solve a search problem (Π, Y ),
the adversary in the definition of hardness in relative entropy comprises a pair of algorithm
(G˜,S) where G˜ is a two-block generator outputting valid (instance, witness) pairs for Π
and S is a simulator for G˜: given an instance y, the goal of S is to output randomness r
for G˜ such that G˜1(r) = y. Formally, the definition is as follows.
Definition 3.2 (hardness in relative entropy). Let (Π, Y ) be a distributional search problem.
We say that (Π, Y ) has hardness (t,∆) in relative entropy if:
KL
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜)
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y ) > ∆ ,
for all pairs (G˜,S) of time t algorithms where G˜ is a two-block generator supported on Π
and R˜ is uniform randomness for G˜1. Similarly, for δ ∈ [0, 1], (Π, Y ) has hardness (t,∆)
in δ-min relative entropy if for all such pairs:
KLδmin
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜)
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y ) > ∆ .
Note that a pair (G˜, S) achieves a relative entropy of zero in Definition 3.2 if G˜1(R) has
the same distribution as Y and if G˜1
(
S(y)
)
= y for all y ∈ Supp(Y ). In this case, writing
G˜w
def
= G˜2, we have that G˜w
(
S(Y )
)
is a valid witness for Y since G˜ is supported on Π.
More generally, the composition G˜w ◦ S solves the search problem (Π, Y ) whenever
G˜1
(
S(Y )
)
= Y . When the relative entropies in Definition 3.2 are upper-bounded, we
can lower bound the probability of the search problem being solved (Lemma 3.4). This
immediately implies that hard search problems are also hard in relative entropy.
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Theorem 3.3. Let (Π, Y ) be a distributional search problem. If (Π, Y ) is (t, ε)-hard, then
it has hardness (t′,∆′) in relative entropy and (t′,∆′′) in δ-min relative entropy for every
δ ∈ [0, 1] where t′ = Ω(t),4 ∆′ = log(1/ε) and ∆′′ = log(1/ε)− log(1/δ).
Remark. As we see, a “good” simulator S for a generator G˜ is one for which G˜1
(
S(Y )
)
= Y
holds often. It will be useful in Section 4 to consider simulators S which are allowed to fail
by outputting a failure string r /∈ Supp(R˜), (e.g. r = ⊥) and adopt the convention that
G˜1(r) = ⊥ whenever r /∈ Supp(R˜). With this convention, we can without loss of generality
add the requirement that G˜1
(
S(Y )
)
= Y whenever S(Y ) ∈ Supp(R˜): indeed, S can always
check that it is the case and if not output a failure symbol. For such a simulator S, observe
that for all r ∈ Supp(R˜), the second variable on both sides of the relative entropy in
Definition 3.2 is obtained by applying G˜1 on the first variable and can thus be dropped,
leading to a simpler definition of hardness in relative entropy: KL
(
R˜
∥∥∥S(Y )) > ∆.
Theorem 3.3 is an immediate consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Let (Π, Y ) be a distributional search problem and (G˜, S) be a pair of algorithms
with G˜ = (G˜1, G˜w) a two-block generator supported on Π. Define the linear-time oracle
algorithm AG˜w,S(y)
def
= G˜w(S(y)). For ∆ ∈ R+ and δ ∈ [0, 1]:
1. If KL
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜)
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y ) ≤ ∆ then Pr [Π(Y,AG˜w,S(Y ))] ≥ 1/2∆.
2. If KLδmin
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜)
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y ) ≤ ∆ then Pr [Π(Y,AG˜w,S(Y ))] ≥ δ/2∆.
Proof. We have:
Pr
[
Π
(
Y,AG˜w,S(Y )
)]
= Pr
[
Π(Y, G˜w(S(Y )))
]
≥ Pr
[
G˜1(S(Y )) = Y
]
(G˜ is supported on Π)
=
∑
r∈Supp(R˜)
Pr
[
S(Y ) = r ∧ Y = G˜1(r)
]
= E
r←R˜
Pr
[
S(Y ) = r ∧ Y = G˜1(r)
]
Pr
[
R˜ = r
]

= E
r←R˜
y←G˜1(r)
[
2−KL
∗
r,y(R˜,G˜1(R˜)‖S(Y ),Y )
]
.
Now, the first claim follows by Jensen’s inequality (since x 7→ 2−x is convex) and the second
claim follows by Markov’ inequality when considering the event that the sample relative
entropy is smaller than ∆ (which occurs with probability at least δ by assumption).
4For the theorems in this paper that relate two notions of hardness, the notation t′ = Ω(t) means that
there exists a constant C depending only on the computational model such that t′ ≥ C · t.
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Relation to relative pseudoentropy. In [VZ12], the authors introduced the notion
of relative pseudoentropy5: for jointly distributed variables (Y,W ), W has relative pseu-
doentropy given Y if it is hard for a polynomial time adversary to approximate—measured
in relative entropy—the conditional distribution W given Y . Formally:
Definition 3.5 (relative pseudoentropy, Def. 3.4 in [VZ12]). Let (Y,W ) be a pair of
random variables, we say that W has relative pseudoentropy (t,∆) given Y if for all time
t randomized algorithm S, we have:
KL (Y,W ‖Y,S(Y )) > ∆ .
As discussed in Section 1.2, it was shown in [VZ12] that if f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
is a one-way function, then
(
f(X), X1, . . . , Xn) has next-bit pseudoentropy for uniform
X ∈ {0, 1}n (see Theorem 1.2). The first step in proving this result was to prove that X
has relative pseudoentropy given f(X) (see Lemma 1.4).
We observe that when (Y,W ) is of the form (f(X), X) for some function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n and variable X over {0, 1}n, then relative pseudoentropy is implied by hardness in
relative entropy by simply fixing G˜ to be the “honest sampler” G˜(X) = (f(X), X). Indeed,
in this case we have:
KL
(
X, G˜1(X)
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y ) = KL (X, f(X) ‖ S(Y ), Y ) .
We can thus recover Lemma 1.4 as a direct corollary of Theorem 3.3.
Corollary 3.6. Consider a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and define Πf def= {(f(x), x) :
x ∈ {0, 1}n} and Y def= f(X) for X uniform over {0, 1}n. If f is (t, ε)-one-way, then
(Πf , Y ) has hardness
(
t′, log(1/ε)
)
in relative entropy and X has relative pseudoentropy(
t′, log(1/ε)
)
given Y with t′ = Ω(t).
Witness hardness in relative entropy. We also introduce a relaxed notion of hardness
in relative entropy called witness hardness in relative entropy. In this notion, we further
require (G˜, S) to approximate the joint distribution of (instance, witness) pairs rather than
only instances. For example, the problem of inverting a functionf over a random input
X is naturally associated with the distribution
(
f(X), X
)
. The relaxation in this case
is analogous to the notion of distributional one-way function for which the adversary is
required to approximate the uniform distribution over preimages.
Definition 3.7 (witness hardness in relative entropy). Let Π be a binary relation and
(Y,W ) be a pair of random variables supported on Π. We say that (Π, Y,W ) has witness
hardness (t,∆) in relative entropy if for all pairs of time t algorithms (G˜, S) where G˜ is a
two-block generator supported on Π, for uniform R˜:
KL
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜), G˜w(R˜)
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y,W) > ∆ .
Similarly, for δ ∈ [0, 1], (Π, Y,W ) has witness hardness (t,∆) in δ-min relative entropy, if
for all such pairs:
KLδmin
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜), G˜w(R˜)
∥∥∥S(Y ), Y,W) > ∆ .
5As already mentioned in the introduction, this notion was in fact called “KL-hardness for sampling” in
[VZ12] but we rename it here to unify the terminology between the various notions discussed here.
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We introduced hardness in relative entropy first, since it is the notion which is most
directly obtained from the hardness of distribution search problems. Observe that by
the data processing inequality for relative entropy (Proposition 2.7), dropping the third
variable on both sides of the relative entropies in Definition 3.7 only decreases them. Hence,
hardness in relative entropy implies witness hardness as stated in (Theorem 3.8). As we
will see in Section 4 witness hardness in relative entropy is the “correct” notion to obtain
inaccessible entropy from: it is in fact equal to inaccessible entropy up to 1/ poly losses.
Theorem 3.8. Let Π be a binary relation and (Y,W ) be a pair of random variables
supported on Π. If (Π, Y ) is (t, ε)-hard, then (Π, Y,W ) has witness hardness (t′,∆′) in
relative entropy and (t′,∆′′) in δ-min relative entropy for every δ ∈ [0, 1] where t′ = Ω(t),
∆′ = log(1/ε) and ∆′′ = log(1/ε)− log(1/δ).
Remark. The data processing inequality does not hold exactly for KLmin, hence the
statement about δ-min relative entropy in Theorem 3.8 does not follow with the claimed
parameters in a black-box manner from Theorem 3.3. However, an essentially identical
proof given in Appendix A yields the result.
4 Inaccessible Entropy and Hardness in Relative Entropy
In this section, we relate our notion of witness hardness in relative entropy to the inaccessible
entropy definition of [HRVW16]. Roughly speaking, we “split” the relative entropy into
blocks and obtain the intermediate notion of next-block inaccessible relative entropy
(Section 4.1) which we then relate to inaccessible entropy (Section 4.2). Together, these
results show that if f is a one-way function, the generator Gf (X) =
(
f(X)1, . . . , f(X)n, X
)
has superlogarithmic inaccessible entropy.
4.1 Next-block hardness and rejection sampling
For an online (adversarial) generator G˜, it is natural to consider simulators S that also
operate in an online fashion. That is:
Definition 4.1 (online simulator). Let G˜ :
∏m
i=1{0, 1}si →
∏m
i=1{0, 1}`i be an online
m-block generator. An online simulator for G˜ is a PPT algorithm S such that for all
y = (y1, . . . , ym) ∈
∏m
i=1{0, 1}`i , defining inductively r̂i def= S(r̂<i, yi) ∈ {0, 1}si , we have for
all i ∈ [m]:
G˜i(r̂≤i) = yi or r̂i = ⊥ .
The running time of S is the total amount of time required to compute r̂1, . . . , r̂m.
The goal of such an online simulator S is to ensure that the distribution of R̂i = S(r̂<i, yi)
is close to that of R˜i|R˜<i = r̂<i, Y˜i = yi where (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜m) def= G˜(R˜≤m) for uniformly
random (R˜1, . . . , R˜m). Equivalently, R̂i should be close to uniform on {r̂i : G˜i(r̂≤i) = yi}.
Measuring closeness with relative entropy, we have:
Definition 4.2 (next-block hardness in relative entropy). The joint distribution Y =
(Y1, . . . , Ym) has next-block hardness (t,∆) in relative entropy if the following holds for
every time t online m-block generator G˜ and every time t online simulator S for G˜.
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Write Y˜≤m
def
= G˜(R˜≤m) for uniform R˜≤m, and define inductively R̂i
def
= S(R̂<i, Yi).
Then we require:
m∑
i=1
KL
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Yi|R̂<i, Y<i) > ∆ .
Similarly, for δ ∈ [0, 1], we say that (Y1, . . . , Ym) has next-block hardness (t,∆) in
δ-min relative entropy if, with the same notations as above:
Pr
r≤m←R˜≤m
y≤m←G˜(r≤m)
[
m∑
i=1
KL∗yi,r<i,y<i
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Yi|R̂<i, Y<i) ≤ ∆] < δ .
Observe that using the chain rule for relative entropy, the sum of relative entropies
appearing in Definition 4.2 is exactly equal to the relative entropies appearing in Defini-
tion 3.2. Since, furthermore considering an online generator G˜ and online simulator S is
only less general than arbitrary pairs (G˜, S), we immediately obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Let (Π, Y ) be a distributional search problem. If (Π, Y ) has hardness (t,∆)
in relative entropy then (Y1, . . . , Ym) has next-block hardness (t,∆) in relative entropy.
Similarly, for any δ ∈ [0, 1], if (Π, Y ) has hardness (t,∆) in δ-min relative entropy then
(Y1, . . . , Ym) has next-block hardness (t,∆) in δ-min relative entropy.
Proof. Immediate using the chain rule for relative (sample) entropy.
The next step is to obtain a notion of hardness that makes no reference to simulators
by considering, for an online block generator G˜, a specific simulator SimG˜,T which on input
(r̂<i, yi), generates R̂i using rejection sampling until G˜i(r̂<i, R̂i) = yi. The superscript T is
the maximum number of attempts after which SimG˜,T gives up and outputs ⊥. The formal
definition of SimG˜,T is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Rejection sampling simulator SimG˜,T for 1 ≤ i ≤ m
Input: yi ∈ {0, 1}∗, r̂<i ∈ ({0, 1}v ∪ {⊥})i−1
Output: r̂i ∈ {0, 1}v ∪ {⊥}
if r̂i−1 = ⊥ then
r̂i ← ⊥; return
end if
repeat
sample r̂i ← {0, 1}v
until G˜i(r̂≤i) = yi or ≥ T attempts
if G˜i(r̂≤i) 6= yi then
r̂i ← ⊥
end if
For the rejection sampling simulator SimG˜,T , we will show in Lemma 4.5 that the
next-block hardness in relative entropy in Definition 4.2 decomposes as the sum of two
terms:
16
1. A term measuring how well G˜≤m approximates the distribution Y in an online manner,
without any reference to a simulator.
2. An error term measuring the failure probability of the rejection sampling procedure
due to having a finite time bound T .
As we show in Lemma 4.6, the error term can be made arbitrarily small by setting the
number of trials T in SimG˜,T to be a large enough multiple of m · 2` where ` is the length
of the blocks of G˜≤m. This leads to a poly(m) time algorithm whenever ` is logarithmic
in m. That is, given an online block generator G˜ for which G˜≤m has short blocks, we
obtain a corresponding simulator “for free”. Thus, considering only the first term leads
to the following clean definition of next-block inaccessible relative entropy that makes no
reference to simulators.
Definition 4.4 (next-block inaccessible relative entropy). The joint distribution
(Y1, . . . , Ym) has next-block inaccessible relative entropy (t,∆), if for every time t online
m-block generator G˜ supported on Y≤m, writing Y˜≤m
def
= G˜(R˜≤m) for uniform R˜≤m, we
have:
m∑
i=1
KL
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i) > ∆ ,
where Ri is a “dummy” random variable over the domain of G˜i and independent of Y≤m+1.
Similarly, for δ ∈ [0, 1], we say that (Y1, . . . , Ym+1) has next-block inaccessible δ-min
relative entropy (t,∆) if for every G˜ as above:
Pr
r≤m←R˜≤m
y≤m←G˜(r≤m)
[
m∑
i=1
KL∗yi,r<i,y<i
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i) ≤ ∆] < δ ,
where (Y˜≤m, R˜≤m) are defined as above.
Remark. Since Y˜<i is a function of R˜<i, the first conditional distribution in the KL is
effectively Y˜i|R˜<i. Similarly the second distribution is effectively Yi|Y<i. The extra random
variables are there for syntactic consistency.
With this definition in hand, we can make formal the claim that, even as sample notions,
the next-block hardness in relative entropy decomposes as next-block inaccessible relative
entropy plus an error term.
Lemma 4.5. For a joint distribution (Y1, . . . , Ym), let G˜ be an online m-block gen-
erator supported on Y≤m. Define (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜m)
def
= G˜(R˜) for uniform random variable
R˜ = (R˜1, . . . , R˜m) and let Ri be a “dummy” random variable over the domain of G˜i and
independent of Y≤m. We also define R̂i
def
= SimG˜,T (R̂<i, Yi) and Ŷi = G˜(R̂≤i). Then, for
all r ∈ Supp(R˜) and y def= G˜(r):
m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Yi|R̂<i, Y<i)
=
m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i)+ m∑
i=1
log
 1
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]
 .
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Moreover, the running time of SimG˜,T on input R̂<i, Yi is O(|ri| · T ), with at most T oracle
calls to G˜.
Proof. Consider r ∈ Supp(R˜) and y def= G˜(r). Then:
m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Yi|R̂<i, Y<i)
=
m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Ŷi|R̂<i, Ŷ<i)
=
m∑
i=1
(
KL∗r,y
(
R˜i|R˜<i, Y˜≤i
∥∥∥ R̂i|R̂<i, Ŷ≤i)+ KL∗r,y (Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i ∥∥∥ Ŷi|R̂<i, Ŷ<i))
=
m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ Ŷi|R̂<i, Ŷ<i) = m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
Y˜i|R˜<i
∥∥∥ Ŷi|R̂<i) .
The first equality is because Yi = Ŷi since we are only considering non-failure cases (ri 6= ⊥).
The second equality is the chain rule. The penultimate equality is by definition of rejection
sampling: R˜i|R˜<i, Y˜≤i and R̂i|R̂<i, Ŷ≤i are identical on Supp(R˜i) since conditioning on
Ŷi = y implies that only non-failure cases (ri 6= ⊥) are considered. The last equality is
because Y˜<i (resp. Ŷ<i) is a deterministic function of R˜<i (resp. R̂<i).
We now relate Ŷi|R̂<i to Yi|Y<i:
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|R̂<i = r<i
]
= Pr
[
Ŷi = yi, Yi = yi|R̂<i = r<i
]
(Ŷi = yi ⇔ Ŷi = yi ∧ Yi = yi)
= Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]
· Pr
[
Yi = yi|R̂<i = r<i
]
(Bayes’ Rule)
= Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]
· Pr [Yi = yi|Y<i = y<i] ,
where the last equality is because when r ∈ Supp(R˜), R̂<i = r<i ⇒ Y<i = y<i and because
Yi is independent of R̂<i given Y<i (as R̂<i is simply a randomized function of Y<i). The
conclusion of the lemma follows by combining the previous two derivations.
Observe that taking expectations with respect to a uniform R˜ on both sides in the
conclusion of Lemma 4.5, we get that next-block hardness in relative entropy is equal to
the sum of next-block inaccessible relative entropy and the expectation of the error term
coming from the rejection sampling procedure. The following lemma upper bounds this
expectation.
Lemma 4.6. Let G˜ be an online m-block generator, and let Li
def
= 2|G˜i| be the size of the
codomain of G˜i, i ∈ [m]. Then for all i ∈ [m], r<i ∈ Supp(R˜<i) and uniform R˜i:
E
yi←G˜i(r<i,R˜i)
log 1
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]
 ≤ log(1 + Li − 1
T
)
.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. By definition of SimG˜,T , we have:
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]
= 1−
(
1− Pr
[
G˜i(r<i, R˜i) = yi
])T
.
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Applying Jensen’s inequality, we have:
E
yi←G˜i(r<i,R˜i)
log
 1
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]

≤ log E
yi←G˜i(r<i,R˜i)
 1
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]

= log
 ∑
y∈Im(G˜i(r<i,·))
py
1− (1− py)T

where py = Pr
[
G˜i(r<i, R˜i) = y
]
. Since the function x/
(
1− (1− x)T ) is convex (see
Lemma A.1 in the appendix), the maximum of the expression inside the logarithm over
probability distributions {py} is achieved at the extremal points of the standard probability
simplex. Namely, when all but one py → 0 and the other one is 1. Since limx→0 x/
(
1−
(1− x)T ) = 1/T :
log
 ∑
y∈Im(G˜i)
py
1− (1− py)T
 ≤ log(1 + (Li − 1) · 1
T
)
.
By combining Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6, we are now ready to state the main result of this
section, relating witness hardness in relative entropy to next-block inaccessible relative
entropy.
Theorem 4.7. Let Π be a binary relation and let (Y,W ) be a pair of random variables
supported on Π. Let Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym) be a partition of Y into blocks of at most ` bits.
Then we have:
1. if (Π, Y,W ) has witness hardness (t,∆) in relative entropy, then for every 0 < ∆′ ≤
∆, (Y1, . . . , Ym,W ) has next-block inaccessible relative entropy (t
′,∆ − ∆′) where
t′ = Ω(t∆′/(m22`)).
2. if (Π, Y,W ) has witness hardness (t,∆) in δ-min relative entropy then for every
0 < ∆′ ≤ ∆ and 0 ≤ δ′ ≤ 1 − δ, we have that (Y1, . . . , Ym,W ) has next-block
inaccessible (δ + δ′)-min relative entropy (t′,∆−∆′) where t′ = Ω(tδ′∆′/(m22`)).
Proof. We consider an online generator G˜ supported on (Y1, . . . , Ym,W ) and the simulator
SimG˜,T . For convenience, we sometimes write Ym+1 for W . Define R˜
def
= R˜≤m where R˜≤m is
a sequence of independent and uniformly random variables, Y˜≤m+1
def
= G˜(R˜), G˜1(R˜)
def
= Y˜≤m
and G˜w(R˜)
def
= Y˜m+1. We also write for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, R̂i def= SimG˜,T (R̂<i, Yi), Ŷi def= G˜(R̂≤i)i.
Finally we define SG˜,T (Y )
def
= R̂≤m.
Observe that (G˜1, G˜w) is a two-block generator supported on Π, so the pair (G˜,S
G˜,T )
forms a pair a algorithms as in the definition of witness hardness in relative entropy
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(Definition 3.7). We focus on sample notions first, and consider r ∈ Supp(R˜), y ∈
Supp(Y˜≤m) and w ∈ Supp(Y˜m+1). First we use the chain rule to isolate the witness block:
KL∗r,y,w
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜), G˜w(R˜)
∥∥∥SG˜,T (Y ), Y,W)
= KL∗r,y,w
(
G˜w(R˜)|R˜, G˜1(R˜)
∥∥∥W |SG˜,T (Y ), Y )+ KL∗r,y,w (R˜, G˜1(R˜)∥∥∥SG˜,T (Y ), Y )
= KL∗r,y,w
(
Y˜m+1|R˜≤m, Y˜≤m
∥∥∥Ym+1|R≤m, Y≤m)+ KL∗r,y,w (R˜, G˜1(R˜) ∥∥∥SG˜,T (Y ), Y ) .
Next, as in Theorem 4.3 we apply the chain rule to decompose the second term on the
right-hand side and obtain next-block hardness in relative entropy:
KL∗r,y,w
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜)
∥∥∥SG˜,T (Y ), Y ) = m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y,w
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Yi|R̂<i, Y<i) .
Finally, we use Lemma 4.5 to further decompose the right-hand side term into inacces-
sible relative entropy and the rejection sampling error:
m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y,w
(
R˜i, Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥ R̂i, Yi|R̂<i, Y<i)
=
m∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i)+ m∑
i=1
log
 1
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]
 .
Combining the previous derivations, we obtain:
KL∗r,y,w
(
R˜, G˜1(R˜), G˜w(R˜)
∥∥∥SG˜,T (Y ), Y,W)
=
m+1∑
i=1
KL∗r,y
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i)+ m∑
i=1
log
 1
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|Yi = yi, R̂<i = r<i
]
 .
Now, the first claim of the theorem follows by taking expectations on both sides and
observing that when T = m · 2`/(∆′ ln 2), Lemma 4.6 implies that the expected value of
the rejection sampling error is smaller than ∆′.
For the second claim, we first establish using Lemma 4.6 and Markov’s inequality that:
Pr
y≤m+1←Y˜≤m+1
r←R˜
 m∑
i=1
log
 1
Pr
[
Ŷi = yi|R̂<i = r<i, Ŷ<i = y<i
]
 ≥ m · 2`
Tδ′ ln 2
 ≤ δ′
and we reach a similar conclusion by setting T = m · 2`/(δ′∆′ ln 2).
Remark. For fixed distribution and generators, in the limit where T grows to infinity, the
error term caused by the failure of rejection sampling in time T vanishes. In this case,
hardness in relative entropy implies next-block inaccessible relative entropy without any
loss in the hardness parameters.
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4.2 Next-block inaccessible relative entropy and inaccessible entropy
We first recall the definition from [HRVW16], slightly adapted to our notations.
Definition 4.8 (Inaccessible Entropy). Let (Y1, . . . , Ym+1) be a joint distribution.
6 We say
that (Y1, . . . , Ym+1) has inaccessible entropy (t,∆) if for all (m+ 1)-block online generators
G˜ running in time t and consistent with (Y1, . . . , Ym+1):
m+1∑
i=1
(
H(Yi|Y<i)−H(Y˜i|R˜<i)
)
> ∆ .
where (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜m+1) = G˜(R˜1, . . . , R˜m+1) for a uniform R˜≤m+1.
Similarly (Y1, . . . , Ym+1) has inaccessible δ-max entropy (t,∆) if for all (m+ 1)-block
online generators G˜ running in time t and consistent with (Y1, . . . , Ym+1):
Pr
r≤m+1←R˜≤m+1
y≤m+1←G˜(r≤m+1)
[
m+1∑
i=1
(
H∗yi,y<i (Yi|Y<i)−H∗yi,r<i
(
Y˜i|R˜<i
))
≤ ∆
]
< δ .
Unfortunately, one unsatisfactory aspect of Definition 4.8 is that inaccessible entropy
can be negative since the generator G˜ could have more entropy than (Y1, . . . , Ym+1): if all
the Yi are independent biased random bits, then a generator G˜ outputting unbiased random
bits will have negative inaccessible entropy. On the other hand, next-block inaccessible
relative entropy (Definition 4.4) does not suffer from this drawback.
Moreover, in the specific case where (Y1, . . . , Ym+1) is a flat distribution
7, then no
distribution with the same support can have higher entropy and in this case Definitions 4.4
and 4.8 coincide as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9. Let (Y1, , . . . , Ym+1) be a flat distribution and G˜ be an (m + 1)-block
generator consistent with Y≤m+1. Then for Y˜≤m+1 = G˜(R˜≤m+1) for uniform R˜≤m+1:
1. For every y≤m+1, r≤m+1 ∈ Supp(Y˜≤m+1, R˜≤m+1), it holds that
m+1∑
i=1
(
H∗yi,y<i (Yi|Y<i)−H∗yi,r<i
(
Y˜i|R˜<i
))
=
m+1∑
i=1
KL∗yi,y<i,r<i
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i)
In particular, (Y1, . . . , Ym+1) has next-block inaccessible δ-min relative entropy (t,∆)
if and only if it has inaccessible δ-max entropy (t,∆).
6We write m + 1 the total number of blocks, since in this section we will think of Ym+1 (also written as
W ) as the witness of a distributional search problem and (Y1, . . . , Ym) are the blocks of the instance as in
the previous section.
7For example, the distribution (Y≤m, Ym+1) = (f(U), U) for a function f and uniform input U is always
a flat distribution even if f itself is not regular.
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2. Furthermore,
m+1∑
i=1
(
H (Yi|Y<i)−H
(
Y˜i|R˜<i
))
=
m+1∑
i=1
KL
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i) ,
so in particular, (Y1, . . . , Ym+1) has next-block inaccessible relative entropy (t,∆) if
and only if it has inaccessible entropy (t,∆).
Proof. For the sample notions, the chain rule (Proposition 2.6) gives:
m+1∑
i=1
H∗yi,y<i (Yi|Y<i) = H∗y (Y≤m+1) = log | Supp(Y≤m+1)|
for all y since Y is flat. Hence:
log|Supp(Y≤m+1)| −
m+1∑
i=1
H∗yi,y<i
(
Y˜i|R˜<i
)
=
m+1∑
i=1
(
H∗yi,y<i (Yi|Y<i)−H∗yi,r<i
(
Y˜i|R˜<i
))
=
m+1∑
i=1
KL∗yi,y<i,r<i
(
Y˜i|R˜<i, Y˜<i
∥∥∥Yi|R<i, Y<i) ,
so the second claim follows by taking the expectation over (Y˜≤m+1, R˜≤m+1) on both
sides.
By chaining the reductions between the different notions of hardness considered in this
work (hardness in relative entropy, next-block inaccessible relative entropy and inaccessible
entropy), we obtain a more modular proof of the theorem of Haitner et al. [HRVW16],
obtaining inaccessible entropy from any one-way function.
Theorem 4.10. Let n be a security parameter, f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a (t, ε)-one-
way function, and X be uniform over {0, 1}n. For ` ∈ {1, . . . , n}, decompose f(X) def=
(Y1, . . . , Yn/`) into blocks of length `. Then:
1. For every 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ log(1/ε), (Y1, . . . , Yn/`, X) has inaccessible entropy
(t′, log(1/ε)−∆) for t′ = Ω (t ·∆ · `2/(n2 · 2`)).
2. For every 0 < δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ log(1/ε)− log(2/δ), (Y1, . . . , Yn/`, X) has inacces-
sible δ-max entropy (t′, log(1/ε)− log(2/δ)−∆) for t′ = Ω (t · δ ·∆ · `2/(n2 · 2`)).
Proof. Since f is (t, ε)-one-way, the distributional search problem
(
Πf , f(X)
)
where Πf =
{(f(x), x) : x ∈ {0, 1}n} is (t, ε)-hard. Clearly, (f(X), X) is supported on Πf , so by
applying Theorem 3.8, we have that (Πf , f(X), X) has witness hardness (Ω(t), log(1/ε))
in relative entropy and (Ω(t), log(1/ε)− log(2/δ)) in δ/2-min relative entropy. Thus, by
Theorem 4.7 we have that (Y1, . . . , Yn/`, X) has next-block inaccessible relative entropy(
Ω
(
t ·∆ · `2/(n2 · 2`)) , log(1/ε)−∆) and next-block inaccessible δ-min relative entropy(
Ω
(
t · δ ·∆ · `2/(n2 · 2`)) , log(1/ε)− log(2/δ)−∆), and we conclude by Theorem 4.9.
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Remark. For comparison, the original proof of [HRVW16] shows that for every 0 < δ ≤ 1,
(Y1, . . . , Yn/`, X) has inaccessible δ-max entropy (t
′, log(1/ε)− 2 log(1/δ)−O(1)) for t′ =
Ω˜
(
t · δ · `2/(n2 · 2`)), which in particular for fixed t′ has quadratically worse dependence
on δ in terms of the achieved inaccessible entropy: log(1/ε)− 2 · log(1/δ)− O(1) rather
than our log(1/ε)− 1 · log(1/δ)−O(1).
Corollary 4.11 (Theorem 4.2 in [HRVW16]). Let n be a security parameter, f : {0, 1}n
→ {0, 1}n be a strong one-way function, and X be uniform over {0, 1}n. Then for every
` = O(log n), (f(X)1...`, . . . , f(X)n−`+1...n, X) has inaccessible entropy
(
nω(1), ω(log n)
)
and inaccessible 1/nω(1)-max entropy
(
nω(1), ω(log n)
)
.
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A Missing Proofs
Lemma A.1. For all t ≥ 1, f : x 7→ x1−(1−x)t is convex over [0, 1].
Proof. We instead show convexity of f˜ : x 7→ f(1 − x). A straightforward computation
gives:
f˜ ′′(x) =
xt−2t
(
t(1− x)(xt + 1)− (1 + x)(1− xt))
(1− xt)3
so that it suffices to show the non-negativity of g(x) = t(1− x)(xt + 1)− (1 + x)(1− xt)
over [0, 1]. The function g has second derivative t(1− x)(t2− 1)xt−2, which is non-negative
when x ∈ [0, 1], and thus the first derivative g′ is non-decreasing. Also, the first derivative
at 1 is equal to zero, so that g′ is non-positive over [0, 1] and hence g is non-increasing over
this interval. Since g(1) = 0, this implies that g is non-negative over [0, 1] and f is convex
as desired.
Theorem A.2 (Theorem 3.8 restated). Let Π be a binary relation and let (Y,W ) be pair
of random variables supported on Π. If (Π, Y ) is (t, ε)-hard, then (Π, Y,W ) is (t′,∆′)
witness hard in relative entropy and (t′,∆′′) witness hard in δ-min relative entropy for
every δ ∈ [0, 1] where t′ = Ω(t), ∆′ = log(1/ε) and ∆′′ = log(δ/ε).
Proof. We proceed similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.3. Let (G˜, S) be a pair of algorithms
with G˜ = (G˜1, G˜w) a two-block generator supported on Π. Define the linear-time oracle
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algorithm AG˜w,S(y)
def
= G˜w(S(y)). Then
Pr
[
Π
(
Y,AG˜w,S(Y )
)]
= Pr
[
Π(Y, G˜w(S(Y )))
]
≥ Pr
[
G˜1(S(Y )) = Y
]
(G˜ is supported on Π)
=
∑
r∈Supp(R˜)
Pr
[
S(Y ) = r ∧ Y = G˜1(r)
]
≥
∑
r∈Supp(R˜)
w∈Supp(G˜2(R˜))
Pr
[
S(Y ) = r ∧ Y = G˜1(r) ∧W = w
]
= E
r←R˜
w←G˜2(r)
Pr
[
S(Y ) = r ∧ Y = G˜1(r) ∧W = w
]
Pr
[
R˜ = r ∧ G˜2(r) = w
]

= E
r←R˜
y←G˜1(r)
w←G˜2(r)
[
2−KL
∗
r,y,w(R˜,G˜1(R˜),G˜2(R˜)‖S(Y ),Y,W)
]
,
The witness hardness in relative entropy then follows by applying Jensen’s inequality (since
2−x is convex) and the witness hardness in δ-min relative entropy follows by Markov’s
inequality by considering the event that the sample relative entropy is smaller than ∆ (this
event has density at least δ).
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